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Abstract
This paper employs a cooperative approach to insurance group formation prob-
lems. The insurance group formation is analyzed in terms of stability with respect
to one-person deviations. Depending on the exact contractual setting, three stabil-
ity concepts are proposed: individual, contractual and compensation stability. When
we apply our general framework to the standard insurance setting of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976), we find that, in each type of contractual setting, there are stable
individually rational pooling outcomes while, on the contrary, individually rational
separating outcomes are not stable.
JEL Classification: C71, D02
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1 Introduction
This paper views insurance group formation as a problem of cooperative nature. The
value of an insurance group is generated by the ability of group members to smooth
their consumption by pooling the risk of a loss. While insurance companies, organiza-
tions widely studied in the insurance market literature, have as an objective to maximize
profits, the objective of an insurance group is to maximize the welfare of the group. In
this setting the clients of an insurance group are also stakeholders of the company. As
such insurance group clients divide the value of the group generated by their cooperation
∗We are grateful to C. Di Maria, A. Estévez, H. Hamers and participants in a workshop at CentER and
at SING Meeting on Game Theory in Maastricht for useful comments.
†Corresponding author: Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University,
Warandelaan 2, P.O. Box 90153, 5000LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. Email: e.a.lazarova@uvt.nl.
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amongst themselves. The advantages of employing a cooperative approach to studying
insurance organizations has been discussed by Boyd, Prescott, and Smith (1988).
The issue we investigate is the stability of endogenous insurance group formation
under various contractual arrangements. We regard the insurance group1 and an indi-
vidual member as two sides in a contract. The arrangement gives particular rights, such
as the right to end the contract and the right to be compensated to one or both of the
parties. Depending on the allocation of rights, we distinguish between three types of
contractual arrangements leading to the notions of individual, contractual, and compen-
sation stability. Individual and contractual stability give the individual member the right
to end the contract but do not allow for compensation rights. Contractual stability set-
ting in addition gives a veto right to the group. To end the contract a member needs the
agreement of the rest of the groups members. If they are worse-off after the change, they
disagree. The third concept, compensation stability, gives both parties the right to end
the contract and the right to be compensated in case they are worse-off after the change.
Compensation stability has two complementary sides to it: pull-in and push-out stability.
Pull-in stability reflects external stability by allowing an insurance group to attract new
members. On the other hand, push-out stability reflects internal stability by allowing
insurance groups to push out one of their members.
The focus on contractual arrangements is justified, on one hand, by the fact that
contracts are common arrangements in insurance groups, but more importantly by the
observation that agents, being part of large groups, are anonymous to each other. Thus,
no group deviations are allowed in our setting. This makes the core an inadequate equi-
librium concept for stability analysis. To the best of our knowledge all other works of-
fering cooperative approach to insurance group formation, e.g. Demange and Guesnerie
(2001)2, Kahn and Mookherjee (1995), Boyd, Prescott, and Smith (1988), and Boyd and
Prescott (1986) allow for group deviations. These works focus on studying informational
asymmetry and the properties of the core-stable insurance group structure under various
channels of signalling. Instead we abstract from the asymmetric information problem to
develop contract-based stability concepts.
With respect to the relation of our contractual stability concepts to the rest of the
literature, individual and contractual stability are conceptually similar to individual and
contractual stability introduced in the hedonic coalition formation setting (see Bogomol-
maia and Jackson (2004)). In hedonic coalition formation, however, each player has
exogenously determined preferences over membership in all coalitions while in our set-
ting, a player’s preferences are endogenous as they depend on her share from the group’s
value and her outside options.
To make this point more clear, we elaborate on the behavioral assumptions we make.
We assume that each player makes a decision to join/leave a group based on her own
perceived payoff without taking into account the effect of her actions on other players’
1Here by group we mean the rest of the group members.
2Demange and Guesnerie (2001) explicitly model anonymous agents, however, this assumption only
concerns the information channels rather than the group-wide deviation possibilities.
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payoffs. A player’s payoff from group membership is endogenously determined. It de-
pends on her “power” to obtain a share of the group value. This power-based measure,
though related, is not entirely determined by the player’s marginal contribution3 but also
depends on her outside options, i.e. what other groups are being formed and how much
she can possibly get as a share of their payoff, i.e. the endogenous structure of the insur-
ance group formation. In this way a member of a group with high value might prefer to
switch to a group with a smaller value because her payoff in the latter is higher than the
share she gets from the former. By switching insurance groups, though, a player changes
the outside options for the rest of the players, which she does not take into account at
the time of the move. Accordingly, by switching insurance groups, the player also affects
another player’s relative power in bargaining for a share from the group value, not only
in the two groups in which the membership has changed, but also in the rest of the in-
surance groups. Not taking into accounts the market-wide effects of her actions makes
each player myopic.4
In this general setting, we find that there are insurance groups formation problems in
which there is no individually stable outcomes. Moreover Pareto optimal outcomes may
not be individually stable either. We use individual stability as a stepping stone for the
construction of the other two stability concepts. Contractual stability and compensation
stability have positive existence results. The contractual stability setting, however, does
not allow for one-player value increasing deviations to take place, while compensation
stability does.
As an application of our theoretical framework we consider the insurance market for
damages as described in the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We refer to
the setting as “mutual insurance” to emphasize the cooperative nature of the problem and
distinguish it from the third-party market insurance setting studied by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). We focus on the stability of two types of outcomes widely studied in the
literature: pooling and separating outcomes. We find that given the assumption of risk
averse players, all pooling outcomes are contractually and compensation stable, while no
separating outcomes are individually or compensation stable. The individually rational
pooling outcomes are individually stable and, moreover, this type of outcomes exists in
every mutual insurance formation problem. Finally, no individually rational separating
outcome is contractually stable either. What drives these results is the possibility for side-
payments within groups and, in the case of the compensation setting, between groups.
The paper is structured in the following way. In Section 2 we define the insurance
formation problem and present the three stability concepts. We present existence re-
sults as well as a technical discussion on the relation between the concepts in Section 3.
In Section 4 we apply the problem to the classical insurance market of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976), and discuss the stable outcomes in terms of the risk composition of the
3Insurance groups generate value by pooling the risk of their members. Thus, each member’s contribu-
tion to the group value is completely determined by her ex-ante given risk type.
4The assumption of myopic players is in contrast to Kahn and Mookherjee (1995) who analyze players
with a fair degree of “foresightedness”.
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groups. Section 5 concludes.
2 Insurance group formation and contractual settings
There is a finite set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Players in the set N form coalitions, to
which we will refer as insurance groups. The collection of subsets of N is denoted by 2N.
A player cannot be a member of more than one insurance group. The collection of all
partitions of N is denoted as P. Each insurance group generates value by the cooperation
of its members. This value differs depending on the identity of the group members. For
the purposes of the general analysis, it suffices to regard this relation as given by a value
function v : 2N → R. The pair (N, v) such that v(∅) = 0 defines an insurance group
formation problem, to which we will refer as an insurance problem for brevity. Without
loss of generality, we study zero-normalized problems, i.e., v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Definition 2.1 An outcome of an insurance problem (N, v) is
(i) a partition P ∈ P; and
(ii) a payoff vector x ∈ RN, which is efficient, i.e.:
∑
i∈S xi = v(S), for all S ∈ P.
We refer to outcomes (P, x) such that P has a maximum total partition value and x is
efficient as Pareto optimal outcomes.
Given the insurance group value, a member’s payoff depends on an endogenous al-
location of the group value. A player i ∈ N prefers to be a member of an insurance
group which yield a higher payoff to her. A fair player’s payoff from an insurance group
will also depend on the exact partition of the set of players, since the composition of the
other groups in the partition defines the outside options. This point will become more
clear with the discussion of the stability concepts below.
2.1 Individual stability
In the contractual arrangement of individual stability the right to end the contract is
given only to the individual members and no compensatory obligations are imposed.
Individual stability thus entails that a member cannot obtain a higher payoff by joining
another insurance group in the partition or by forming a new single-member group.5
5Implicit in the definition of individual stability is that a member can join an insurance group only if her
membership is unanimously approved by the current group members. This is to say, a player can join an
insurance group if the current members have at least as high payoff after she joins as they had before. This
is why when a player decides on joining a coalition she bases her decision on her marginal contribution to
the group value.
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Definition 2.2 An outcome (P, x) of an insurance problem (N, v) is individually stable if
there are no i ∈ N and S ∈ P ∪ {∅} with i < S such that
xi < v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S).
The following example is used to illustrate the concept of individual stability.
Example 2.3 [An individually stable outcome] Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Consider the value
function v as given below:
S ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 0
.





and x = 0. Clearly, this is an individually stable outcome: the
players can deviate only by joining the empty set and obtain a payoff of zero.
No other outcome is individually stable because there is always at least one player
who wants to deviate. As an example consider a Pareto optimal type of outcomes (P, x)




and payoff vectors of the type x = (0, α, 4 − α) with α ∈ [0, 4].
The best outside option for player 2 is to join 1 in insurance group {1, 2} where player
2’s perceived payoff is at most two. Thus for player 2 not to have incentives to deviate
it must be that x2 = α ≥ 2. Similarly, for player 3 not to deviate, it must hold that
x3 = 4 − α ≥ 3. The two conditions cannot hold simultaneously in any efficient payoff
vector and hence this type of outcomes cannot be individually stable. 
As seen above there are insurance problems in which no Pareto optimal outcome is
individually stable. The next example shows that there are insurance problems in which
there are no individually stable outcomes.
Example 2.4 [No individually stable outcome] Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Consider the value
function v as given below:
S ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 −1
.
Note that the only difference with Example 2.3 is that here the grand coalition has a
negative value. The outcome formed by the grand coalition and an efficient payoff vector
cannot be individually stable: by the efficiency of the payoff vector follow that there is
at least one player who has negative payoff, thus, such player will deviate by forming a
new single-member group. 
2.2 Contractual stability
Contractual stability is based on individual incentives under the additional condition that
a deviating member needs to acquire permission from the group in case she wants to
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end the contract. The group grants the permission only if the rest of the group members
are as well-off without that particular member as when she is part of the group. In a
contractually stable outcome no player can obtain a higher payoff by joining another
insurance group without making the members of her current insurance group worse-off.
Definition 2.5 An outcome (P, x) of an insurance problem (N, v) is contractually stable
if there are no i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P ∪ {∅} with i ∈ T and S , T such that
xi < v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) and
∑
j∈T\{i}
xj ≤ v(T \ {i}).
The next example illustrates how contractual stability limits the deviating possibilities
of a group member in contrast to individual stability.
Example 2.6 [Contractually stable outcomes] Let (N, v) be the insurance problem of
Example 2.3.
There are multiple contractually stable outcomes in this insurance problem. Any par-
tition besides the partition of singletons can be part of a contractually stable outcome. As
an example, we study the following type of outcomes: P = {{1, 3}, {2}} and x = (α, 0, 3−α)
where α ∈ (0, 3]. These are contractually stable outcomes: player 2’s outside option is to
join {1, 3} in the grand coalition but there her perceived payoff is negative. Neither player
1 nor 3 will give a permission to the other who has incentives to join player 2 since by
being alone the player will have a strictly lower payoff.
An outcome that is not contractually stable is P = {{1, 3}, {2}} and x = (0, 0, 3). Player
3’s outside option to join player 2 in insurance group {2, 3} gives her a higher payoff than
what she has, i.e. 4 > 3 = x3. Player 1 grants permission to player 3 to leave as she
is indifferent between having a payoff of zero in the group {1, 3} or as a member of the
singleton group {1}. 
The above example shows that in the contractual stability setting, there are situations
in which a one-person deviation can lead to an increase in total partition value, yet,
it is not performed because one of the parties of the contract is strictly worse-off. To
overcome this restriction on profitable deviations, we allow for side payments between
players after the contract between them has ended in the next contractual specification.
2.3 Compensation stability
First, the two complementary sides of compensation stability, pull-in stability and push-
out stability, are introduced.
In the contractual setting of pull-in stability, the individual player is the only party
who can end the contract. In case the remaining group members are worse-off, the
new insurance group of the deviating member is obliged to compensate them for this
loss. Thus, in a pull-in stable outcome there is no insurance group that by attracting a
new member may increase its value enough to give higher payoffs to its members after
possible compensation of the incoming player’s previous insurance group.
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Definition 2.7 An outcome (P, x) of an insurance problem (N, v) is pull-in stable if there
are no i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P with i ∈ T and S , T such that6





xj − v(T \ {i})
}
.
In push-out stability the right to end the contract is given only to the insurance group.
An insurance group wants to end the contract of one of its members if by doing so, it can
increase the payoffs of the remaining members. In the push-out setting a compensation
is required in case the member whose contract has been ended has a lower best outside
option than her current payoff as a group member.
Definition 2.8 An outcome (P, x) of an insurance problem (N, v) is push-out stable if there
are no i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P ∪ {∅} with i ∈ T and S , T such that
∑
j∈T\{i}




v(S ∪ {i} − v(S)
)}
.
Combining pull-in and push-out stability, we have compensation stability.
Definition 2.9 An outcome of an insurance problem is compensation stable if it is pull-in
and push-out stable.
To illustrate that compensation setting may overcome the restriction on profitable
deviations of the contractual stability setting, we consider the following example.
Example 2.10 [Compensation stable outcomes] Let (N, v) be as in Example 2.3. There
is one type of compensation stable outcomes, namely the Pareto optimal type of out-
comes (P, x) given by P = {{1}, {2, 3}} and x = (0, x2, x3) where x2 + x3 = 4. These
outcomes are pull-in stable. Insurance group {2, 3} does not want to attract player 1 as
a member since the grand coalition has lower value than their current value. Player 1
can increase the value of its insurance group by attracting either player 2 or 3. Yet, the
increase is not enough to give her a higher payoff after she compensates the remaining
member of group {2, 3} for the change.
These outcomes are also push-out stable. Neither player 2 nor 3 can increase her
payoff by pushing the other player out to join player 1 in an insurance group and com-
pensate her for the change, if needed. Player 1 cannot be pushed out of the singleton
coalition either. 
6Since the empty set is not regarded as an insurance group, it is not included in the possible set of
coalitions that can pull a player in.
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3 Existence and relations
The discussion of existence and relations between the stability contracts is focused on
the notions of compensation and contractual stability. Example 2.4 shows that there are
insurance problems with no individually stable outcomes.
From the definitions of the stability concepts the following results can be obtained in
straightforward fashion.
Proposition 3.1 Let (N, v) be an insurance problem. Then the following results hold:
(i) Any individually stable outcome is contractually stable;
(ii) Any outcome ({N}, x) is pull-in stable;
(iii) Any outcome ({i}i∈N, 0) is push-out stable.
We establish positive existence results with respect to compensation and contractual
stability. In particular, all Pareto optimal outcomes are compensation and contractually
stable.
Theorem 3.2 Any Pareto optimal outcome is both compensation and contractually stable.
Proof. Let (N, v) be an insurance problem. Let (P?, x) be a Pareto optimal outcome of
this insurance problem.
Compensation stability: Suppose (P?, x) is not a compensation stable outcome. Then
either (P?, x) is not pull-in stable or (P?, x) is not push-out stable.
First, suppose (P?, x) is not a pull-in stable outcome. Then there are i ∈ N and
S,T ∈ P? with i ∈ T and S , T such that





xj − v(T \ {i})
}
.
Using the efficiency of the payoff vector, the above inequality implies
v(S) + v(T) < v(S ∪ {i}) + v(T \ {i}).
So the partition P=
[
P? \ {S, T }
]
∪ {S ∪ {i}, T \ {i}} has a higher total partition value
contradicting the Pareto optimality of (P?, x).
Now suppose (P?, x) is not a push-out stable outcome. Then there are i ∈ N and
S,T ∈ P? ∪ {∅} with i ∈ T and S , T such that
∑
j∈T\{i}








Using the efficiency of the payoff vector, the above inequality implies
v(T) + v(S) < v(T \ {i}) + v(S ∪ {i}),
establishing a contradiction.
Contractual stability: Suppose (P?, x) is not a contractually stable outcome. Then
there are i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P? ∪ {∅} with i ∈ T and S , T such that
xi < v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)∑
j∈T\{i}
xj ≤ v(T \ {i}).
Adding up the two inequalities and using the efficiency of the payoff vector, we find
v(T) + v(S) < v(T \ {i}) + v(S ∪ {i}),
establishing a contradiction.
For establishing a relation between compensation stability and contractual stability
we need to introduce one additional property.
Definition 3.3 An outcome (P, x) of an insurance problem is individually rational if xi ≥
v({i}) for all i ∈ N.
Proposition 3.4 Any compensation stable outcome which is individually rational is also
contractually stable.
Proof. Let (N, v) be an insurance problem. Let (P, x) be a compensation stable outcome,
which is individually rational. Then for all i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P with i ∈ T and S , T :





xj − v(T \ {i})
}
.
This implies that for all i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P with i ∈ T and S , T
xi ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) or
∑
j∈T\{i}
xj > v(T \ {i}).
Since (P, x) is individually rational xi ≥ 0 = v({i}) − v({∅}). We conclude that for all i ∈ N
and S,T ∈ P ∪ ∅ with i ∈ T and S , T , it holds that
xi ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) or
∑
j∈T\{i}
xj > v(T \ {i}).
So, (P, x) is contractually stable.
Note that the proof of Proposition 3.4 in fact implies that any pull-in stable outcome
which is individually rational is contractually stable.
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4 Mutual insurance
We apply our stability concepts to the insurance problem studied by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). Their framework is adapted to the general setting presented in Sec-
tion 2. We use the three types of stability concepts to analyze outcomes which differ in
terms of the risk composition of the insurance group. In particular we discuss the pool-
ing and separating outcomes which have received much attention in the literature. In
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) framework, the separating type of outcomes is the only
type that may be stable.
First, we describe the demand for insurance against financial loss. There is a finite set
of players N. All players are expected utility maximizers each with the same increasing
and strictly concave utility function u defined over monetary wealth y, i.e. u : R → R
with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. Each player is endorsed with an initial wealth w. With some
probability π a player incurs a damage which has a monetary equivalent of D where
D < w. There are two groups of players, L and H, forming a partition of N. Players in L
have a low probability πL of incurring a damage. Those in H have a high probability πH.
So πL < πH.
We assume that each insurance group offers the same amount of insurance to all
members equalling the total damage. However, the group may require a different contri-
bution fee per unit of insurance. The contribution fee q(S) of group S is determined by
a zero-profit condition given by:
|S|q(S)D − πL|S ∩ L|D − πH|S ∩H|D = 0.








So, the contribution fee depends only on the relative size of the risk-pool of the insurance
group. In particular, q(S) ∈ [πL, πH]. It is lowest when an insurance group consists of
low-risk members only, and it is highest when it consists of high-risk members only.
The value of an insurance group S is defined to be the total utility of its members.
Formally,




for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. (2)
An insurance problem (N, v) derived from the above described tuple (L,H, u, w, D, πL, πH, q)
with N = L ∪H and v defined by (2) is a mutual insurance group formation problem to
which we refer as a mutual insurance problem for brevity. Note that the value function
is not zero-normalized. However this affects neither the definitions of stability nor the
results in Section 3.
The next example is used to illustrate the mutual insurance setting.
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Example 4.1 [A mutual insurance problem] Consider L = {1, 2} and H = {3}, so N =
{1, 2, 3}. The probabilities of incurring a damage are given by πL = 0.1 and πH = 0.7,
respectively. Every player is endowed with the same amount of initial wealth w = 10
while D = 9. Every player has preferences represented by the same increasing and
strictly concave utility function u defined by u(y) =
√
y for y ≥ 0.
The break-even contribution fee of each insurance group is calculated using Equation





0.1 : S = {1}, {2}, {1, 2};
0.3 : S = {1, 2, 3};
0.4 : S = {1, 3}, {1, 4};
0.7 : S = {3}.
Using the definition of group value given by Equation (2) and the break-even contri-
bution fees, we derive the value function v as given below:
S {∅} {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(S) 0 3.0 3.0 1.9 6.0 5.0 5.0 8.1
.







i∈N xi = 8.1 and x1 ≥ 3, x2 ≥ 3, x3 ≥ 1.9.







i∈N xi = 8.1. 
In the rest of the section the analysis is focused on pooling7 and separating types of
outcomes. Below we give the formal definitions of these outcomes.
Definition 4.2 An outcome (P, x) of a mutual insurance problem (N, v) is called pooling if
P = {N}.
Definition 4.3 An outcome (P, x) of a mutual insurance problem (N, v) with N = L ∪H is
called separating if P = {L,H}.
We first show that the value function satisfies superadditivity.
Lemma 4.4 Let (N, v) be a mutual insurance problem. Then for all S,T ∈ 2N with S∩T = ∅
v(S) + v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T).
Proof. Let (N, v) be a mutual insurance problem derived from (L,H, u,w, D, πL, πH, q)
with N = L ∪H and v defined by Equation (2). Without loss of generality, consider
7Unlike Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) we refer to pooling outcomes only as those outcomes which
contain the grand coalition.
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S, T ∈ 2N \ {∅} with S ∩ T = ∅. Then















= |S ∪ T |
{
|S|
|S ∪ T |u
(
w −






|S ∪ T |u
(
w −









|S ∩ L|πL + |S ∩H|πH + |T ∩ L|πL + |T ∩H|πH
|S ∪ T | D
)}
= v(S ∪ T).
The above inequality follows from the strict concavity of u. The inequality holds as
equality in three cases: S, T ⊂ L; S, T ⊂ H; or |S| = |T | with q(S) = q(T).
Theorem 4.5 In a mutual insurance problem we have
(i) Any pooling outcome is compensation stable;
(ii) Any pooling outcome is contractually stable;
(iii) Any individually rational pooling outcome is individually stable;
(iv) An individually rational pooling outcome exists.
Proof. Lemma 4.4 implies that any pooling outcome is Pareto optimal. Therefore, (i) and
(ii) follow from Theorem 3.2. (iii) is immediate from the definitions, while (iv) follows
from the fact that v(N) ≥∑i∈N v({i}), which is a consequence of Lemma 4.4.
Next, we discuss the stability of the separating outcomes.
Theorem 4.6 In a mutual insurance problem we have
(i) No separating outcome is individually stable;
(ii) No separating outcome is compensation stable;
(iii) No individually rational separating outcome is contractually stable.
Proof. Let (N, v) be a mutual insurance problem derived from (L,H, u,w, D, πL, πH, q)
with N = L ∪H and v defined by Equation (2).
(i) Consider a separating outcome ({L,H}, x). We will show that the value of the
high-risk insurance group is insufficient to give each member at least her outside option
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of joining the low-risk insurance group. For all i ∈ H, the outside option of joining the
low-risk insurance group yields v(L ∪ {i}) − v(L). So for all i ∈ H
v(H) − |H|
(
v(L ∪ {i}) − v(L)
)
=









− |L|u(w − πLD)
)




u(w − πHD) +
|L|
|L| + 1








Here, the inequality follows from the strict concavity of u.
(ii) Consider a separating outcome ({L,H}, x). We will first show that total partition
value increases when a high-risk player joins the low-risk group.
For any i ∈ H











− u(w − πHD) − |L|u(w − πLD)


















The above inequality follows from the strict concavity of u.
Using the efficiency of the payoffs we have
v(L ∪ {i}) + v(H \ {i}) −
(






The above inequality implies that at least one of the inequalities below holds for any
i ∈ H
(
v(L ∪ {i}) − v(L) − xi
)




So for any i ∈ H,













v(L ∪ {i}) − v(L)
)}
.
Therefore, at least one of the pull-in and push-out conditions is violated.
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(iii) Consider an individually rational separating outcome ({L,H}, x). By individual
rationality, for all i ∈ H
xi ≥ v({i}) = u(w − πHD).
By the efficiency of the payoff vector, for all i ∈ H
∑
i∈H
xi = v(H) = |H|u(w − πHD).
Combining both conditions, we obtain that xi = u(w − πHD) for all i ∈ H.
Hence, if any player wants to leave the high risk-group, the rest of the members will
grant permission: for all i ∈ H
∑
j∈H\{i}
xj = |H − 1|u(w − πHD) = v(H \ {i}).
To show that this outcome is not contractually stable, we need to show that the value of
the high-risk group is insufficient to give all of its members their best outside option, i.e.
what they can get by joining the low-risk insurance group. This is already shown in the
proof of (i) above.
5 Conclusion
We studied insurance group formation problems with anonymous membership which
allows for disregarding group deviations. To analyze the stability of group formation
in such settings we employ a contract-based approach. We defined three contractual
arrangements which led to the notions of individual, contractual, and compensation
stability. We have seen that individually stable outcomes may not always exist. However,
if they do, they are necessarily individually rational. Contractual and compensation
stable outcomes, can be found in any insurance group formation problem. However, not
all of these outcomes may be individually rational.
We applied this general framework to a Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) type of model.
Given the possibilities of side payments we find that any pooling outcome is Pareto op-
timal. An individually rational pooling outcome is individually, contractually and com-
pensation stable. An individually rational separating outcome, however, is not stable in
any contractual setting.
References
BOGOMOLMAIA, A., AND M. O. JACKSON (2004): “The Stability of Hedonic Coalition
Structures,” Games and Economic Behavior, 38(2), 201–230.
14
BOYD, J., AND E. PRESCOTT (1986): “Financial Intermediary Coalitions,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 38, 221–232.
BOYD, J., E. PRESCOTT, AND B. SMITH (1988): “Organizations in Economic Analysis,”
Candian Journal of Economics, 21, 477–491.
DEMANGE, G., AND R. GUESNERIE (2001): “On Coalitional Stability of Anonymous In-
terim Mechanisms,” Economic Theory, 18, 367–389.
KAHN, C. M., AND D. MOOKHERJEE (1995): “Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse
Selection Insurance Economy,” Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 113–138.
ROTHSCHILD, M., AND J. STIGLITZ (1976): “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Mar-
kets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 90(4), 629–649.
15
